Abstract
Introduction
From their inception to date, the European treaties ('constitutional charter' of Europe 1 ) have not explicitly empowered the European Union (EU) to formulate direct tax policy -an area left generally to Member States. The limited EU-level intervention witnessed to date in this policy sector, besides the requirement of unanimous consensus of Member States, may also be attributable to this competence allocation between national governments and the EU.
While it has long been acknowledged that the EU could impliedly intervene in national tax systems if they infringe the single market principles, 2 the state-suprastate division of tax into three approaches.
(1) Some legal scholars observe it as an omission in EU law, 6 equivalent to a setback to integration of direct taxes -an unspoken policy domain in EU law that is generally considered as a members' terrain. (2) A segment of tax scholarship views disappearance of the clause as a neutral act with little consequences to supranational EU tax competence; 7 (3) others, however, argue its removal in favour of a wider scope for EU-level actions to eliminate double taxation in the single market. 8 In any case, the debate on repeal to date revolves mainly around the monistic-agenda offering insights on implications for
European legislative powers on tax harmonization.
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This study takes a different path. It seeks to investigate whether the amendment causing repeal of Article 293 EC is an isolated event or whether it is part of a bigger process in the evolution of European legal system at the interface of EU law and international law regimes.
The study draws on an all-inclusive, multi-dimensional approach seeking reasons behind repeal of Article 293 EC and its consequences. I do not exclude the familiar EU-level tax competence debate from this analysis but rather seek to go beyond and employ holistic perspective to view it through the lens of over-all construct of acquis communautaire. I also seek to explore the demise of the clause within a wider constitutional design without losing 6 See, for example, Lehner, Moris (2005) sight of the broad contours of European legal evolution and developments of law-making processes and paradigmatic to EU constitutional construct. The findings of this study indicate that deletion of Article 293 EC does not frustrate the integration agenda. Rather, its removal accords with the conjecture that the European legal system has grown up adequately. That is, the European order is coming of age in terms of departure from the traditional international law regime and developing to maintain its own autonomous standing. The study concludes that the repeal (a) indicates growing reliance on European order, (b) inherits potential for wider EU actions against dual taxation to institute single economic and fiscal market in the true sense, (c) reinforces the differentiated integration notion in (tax) legislation and (d) seeks to avoid undesired (or over-) fragmentation within the sub-systems of an expanding Union territory.
Flexibility in EU integration through inter-state conventions
Since the founding times, intra-Community cooperation at the sub-Union level has remained a characteristic embedded in the EU law. conspicuous exception being part of the Article 293 EC on direct taxes that has been deleted without any express substitute for it under the current EU law.
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Before exploring the logic behind the demise of the clause in question, I begin with setting the contextual framework of European integration project and the chemistry between public international law and the EU law. To this end, first I examine gradual developments taking place over time in subsets of EU (differentiated or flexible integration) at the interface of EU and public international legal regimes. Then, I undertake a detailed analysis of the rationale for, and practical consequences of, the deletion of the clause in question.
As described in the introductory section in relation to Article 293 EC, the integration project was not confined to the instruments originating solely from the legislative powers conferred under the EU law. Rather the integration plan could also be supplemented by intergovernmental agreements under public international law. These latter instruments arising from the inter se cooperation 14 between two or more Member States are based on the classical international relations model. The Member States always could -and still can -enter into inter se cooperation by virtue of their status as nation-states. For the purpose of the analysis at hand, however, we confine our argument to those inter se actions that albeit fall in the spheres of the international arena yet, in the course of EU political and legal evolution, have been promoted (explicitly or otherwise) by the European legal system. This indeed is the kind of flexibility regime wherein resided the variation potential based on Article 293 EC. 13 As mentioned in supra note 3, four policy areas are set out under four indents of Art. 293 EC. The second indent concerning direct taxes is argued here as an exception in the sense that it disappeared without any explicit replacement to integrate direct taxation within or outside EU framework. This is unlike the other three indents of missing in the foundational times. 25 Thus the polity in the initial period represented something akin to a traditional international organization striving for a common economic market.
International law paradigm was therefore inherently embedded in the foundations of constitutional documents and had strong roots in the EU (the then Community) law. A certain degree of kinship between the EU and international law regimes still manifests itself at the time of treaty revisions besides some exceptional situations.
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For tracking the evolutionary path of convention-based flexibility in EU law, analysis in this section however does not consider the developments taking place at the time of treaty revisions. Rather, the investigation takes into account the possibility of inter-state cooperation classified into four groups in the previous section. These inter se instruments have analogies to adoption of secondary law albeit concluded outside the European framework. To investigate the evolutionary process on how and why EU law provided space to Member
States to enter into inter se agreements, the remainder of this section seeks to capture phasewise (primitive to advance) relationship between international and EU legal regimes.
The founding phase
In the early stages, the EU (then Community) structure conceivably had a higher empathy to accommodate international law. At the starting point, features evidencing their close nexus included the intactness of 'full-flagged' national sovereignty (in practical terms) albeit sharing some of their powers (in theory) at the EU (Community)-level. Other key characteristics of the newly-founded order, for example, also included relatively less understood legal bases for supranational actions and hence scanty legislation (secondary law) in various policy areas.
The process of 'communautairization' was therefore not rooted as firmly as witnessed at the subsequent stages of the polity. At the embryonic phase, actions based on the tested model of 25 The process of European constitutionlaization unfolded at later stages; for one influential discourse on how 
The Maastricht phase: Romance between the two regimes at peak
Prior to the Maastricht Treaty, the inter se cooperation produced some of the remarkable integrative tools that otherwise might have been unthinkable within the EU (then Community) framework. To name but one flagship project of those times is the Schengen Agreement.
Besides constitutional amendments (revision under the Single European Act 1986), it may not be an overstatement that the Schengen instrument on creation of borderless Europe remains one of the most influential documents of the initial three decades of the polity. The Schengen process in due course did not confine itself to the single policy area of free movement of persons. Rather, it proved to be a cornerstone of the EU project and extended well beyond the simple free movement notion to an array of allied policy areas. The Schengen regime led to creation of functional demand in societal as well as public domains for further changes and opened a floodgate to integrative processes in several related policy areas. Its spillover effect extended to the realms of visa matters, asylum, immigration, security, and cooperation in police, judicial and criminal matters. 35 While the entire saga of Schengen-led processes is beyond the scope of this article, some of the crucial functional spillovers -within and outside the EU framework -incidental to European free boarder regime -are illustrated in Figure 1 . 36 Against this backdrop, the treaty revision process under the Maastricht in the early 1990s
could not remain insulated to the impacts of the inter se cooperation apparatus, in particular the Schengen-driven imperatives in related policy sectors. I submit that the Schengen progress was the linchpin to the induction of Justice and Home Affairs regime under the Maastricht revision. 37 In the entire history of the EU law, the largest-ever space was allocated to the clauses on inter se cooperation under the Maastricht revision (see Table 2 ). Customs, police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters were added to the scope of inter-state agreements. First, the inter se cooperation in the JHA domain was subject to institutional 'nuts and bolts' through assigning possible roles to European organs under the Amsterdam changes. Later, this role was further refined (under the Nice revision) and converted into an obligatory mandate for the EU organs to scan over the inter se cooperation (see Table 2 to 'empower' EU law through the additional mechanism of (secondary) law-making at the expense of 'de-powering' international law through occupying part of the latter's territory. A split (in the once closer association of the Maastricht phase) between the two regimes became evident that kept growing over time.
The Nice Treaty further deepened the cleavage when it imposed the condition that inter se conventions might come into force only when at least half of the Member States would adopt them. Simultaneously, the condition of critical mass to induce policy variation through enhanced cooperation within the EU system was redefined (Table 2) one-third (eight of the soon to be twenty five) of the Member States. In addition, the 'problematic and dysfunctional aspects' of the Amsterdam clauses on closer cooperation were also streamlined. 39 Changes were also crafted in the system for an easier recourse of subsets to institutional framework by introducing qualified majority voting (except for common foreign and security policy). 40 The result being that EU craving to look back time and again for seeking rescue from international law tools in order to further the integration process in difficult areas of European construction was progressively diminishing.
The Lisbon phase: Separation takes place?
The Lisbon revision proved to be a termination point for the long association spread over five decades between the two regimes. Table 2 shows that (save the Benelux clause) during the Lisbon phase, EU law almost fully got rid of 'outsider clauses' that promoted intergovernmental tools under traditional public international law. 41 At the same time, the European path to flexibility was also further institutionalized through fine-tuning of enhanced cooperation clauses (Arts 326-334 TFEU). 42 The cooperative path along the European In this separation framework of EU and international law, the Benelux cooperation clause seems as an odd survivor in the post-Lisbon world. What prevented the clause from removal?
On its existence in the Lisbon phase, borrowing terminology from biological evolution, I tag it as vestigial remains of the primitive flexibility mode attached to the present corpus of EU law. The Benelux nations were the fore-runners of the integration process; they pioneered in putting the fundamental freedoms into practice and also attained border free area much before the remainder of the Schengen zone. 45 The territorial spillovers and precedential worth In concluding the evolutionary debate on the interplay between EU and international law, I
revisit the divorce metaphor used earlier for their relationship in the post-Lisbon law. The separation between the two regimes signifies the sufficiency of the European system and adequacy of competences to operate independently of international law. It nonetheless may not be interpreted as abandonment on the part of EU law of the patronage of international law in absolute terms. The process of evolution at the interface of the two regimes is ongoing and in hypothetical terms has to remain in one form or another until the 'United States of Europe'.
I seek to symbolize the future relations of the two regimes again by borrowing a phrase from biological evolution -ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny. 48 In an environment of changing needs and unforeseen situations, one may not rule out the occurrences of a phenomenon in which the evolved species (EU law) might sometimes recall and manifest its earlier forms of ancestral species (international law). In the same vein, I also add that whenever the integration project might face this recap experience, the ancestral (international framework) biological evolution where an embryo of an organism undergoes processes which manifest its shapes similar to earlier ancestral forms wherefrom the organism actually originated in the remote past. The hypothesis remains as a side-note rather than dogma in life sciences; however, the notion metaphorically draws some interesting analogies to developments at the interface of EU and international law in the post-Lisbon Europe. Besides this, on an ongoing role of international law in bilateral tax matters, also see infra note 63 and accompanying text.
advanced (EU constitutional framework) form. 49 The developments at the intersection of two frameworks in founding the ESM perhaps offer the best insights on this notion amongst the dramatically changing imperatives of law and politics in the post-crisis Europe.
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The bigger picture drawn in this section based on temporal analysis and legal evolution model of inter se regime evidences some of the vital contours of the rationale behind the policy variations spread over six decades. To this effect, it also develops a framework for seeking in part the broad response to our original question on the logic behind the demise of Article 293 EC -a question to which I finally turn in the next section.
Repeal of Article 293 EC and the post-Lisbon EU order
The discursive analysis of the previous section provides a broad explanatory framework on the relationship between consolidation of European legal order and phasing out of inter se apparatus -Article 293 EC being part of the latter. The analysis therefore offers a conceptual basis to search response to our question on reasons behind removal of the clause. Drawing on this framework, I examine causes of disappearance of the clause in the first segment in general. In the second segment, I attempt to explore consequences of absentia of the provision in EU law particularly its implications for European competence to legislate direct tax policy. 
Rationale behind the repeal and general consequences
Several factors contributed to the emergence of a schism between the international and EU law. Of these, at least three dominate our discussion to follow within the evolutionary discourse analysis. First, after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, it became evident that the biggest-ever accession of ten new Member States (Eastern enlargement) was fast approaching. In the founding phase, for example, even a bilateral cooperation would mean Thirdly, another significant reason behind the decreasing reliance on international law tools lies in the argument that the European legal system was becoming increasingly selfsustainable. To this end, I argue a sufficiency principle in EU legal order. The character of European competences is mobile and ever-changing. 53 Hence the EU powers were gradually growing and the system was attaining sufficient autonomy from public international law. The EU-level influence was increasingly becoming evident by virtue of extension ('functional spillover') to new policy areas either through new legal basis added during treaty revisions 54 or due to the emergence of (implicit) competences within the existing EU law.
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In theory as well as practice, an autonomous order governing a given jurisdiction requires its own legal and administrative tool-kit. The European order moved slowly but persistently from international relations model to attain a unique sui generis status over time. In due course, executive, judicial and legislative functions sharpened and the governing treaties constitutionalized. To this end, the treaty provisions meant for tools of public international law were destined to become endangered species at one stage of the evolution or another of the European law and politics. As an 'alien' apparatus 56 meant for devising 'outsider' tools, Article 293 EC was also no exception.
From the holistic and all-inclusive approach adopted so far, I conclude that the departure of provisions on inter se cooperation generally indicates an advanced and autonomous stage of EU law. It represents a phase when the system frames or refines its own legal structure and 55 In 1990, for example, the first-ever substantive EU legislation (Directives 90/434/EEC and 90/435/EEC) in the field of corporate taxes was adopted after more than three decades since the EEC Treaty; the (implicit)
competence to legislate these directives emerged without any textual amendment to the treaty. On sub-textual character and mobility in Union powers under the EU law, also see Section 4.2.5. 56 As labelled by Weiler, supra note 41.
becomes self-sustainable to travel on European route without seeking life from public international law -be it the case of cooperation under the JHA, 293 EC or other similar provisions.
Implications for EU competence on direct taxes
Taxation was one of the four areas set out under Article 293 EC for inter-state cooperation to abolish double taxation. While the literature also explores the remaining three areas, 57 the repealed clause, however, inquisitively has attracted most of the scholarly attention of European legal discourse on double taxation in the single market. 58 The clause has also been perhaps cited more frequently in the rulings of the ECJ on double taxation disputes than those in the allied three areas set out thereunder. 59 Reference to the provision in the judgements can be found in litigation on double taxation even in the post-repeal period. 60 The main reason behind the extensive emphasis (one may name it obsession) for European tax literature on the repealed provision is that it presented the sole explicit reference to direct for EU-level mandate for direct tax policymaking. 62 The policy area nevertheless resides high on agenda of national governments and thus European tax competence continues to be surrounded by legal and political complexities.
In general
In arguing for an enhanced legal space for EU intervention to approximate national tax 293 EC, settles the delineation of tax power issues once and for ever. Nor do I argue that in the post-Lisbon period, augmentation of European tax competence may take place in the short run and beyond any dispute. It is also conceded that model tax conventions -the international law tools -still have a long way to govern the intra-EU bilateral tax matters. 63 Likewise, the repeal is unlikely to spontaneously impact the current national tax politics and would not trigger any dramatic change to adopt, for example, a sweeping tax directive in the short term.
Nevertheless, in what follows, I submit that conceptually there lies a case for an increasing room for EU tax powers within the constitutional design coupled with differentiated tax integration in subsets in the post-repeal phase.
Unlike the remaining three policy areas set out under Article 293 EC, no direct tax-specific or specialized legal basis exists for EU-level actions in the current EU law. 
From the pre-emption principle perspective
The principle of pre-emption is a notion that generally serves as a measure for courts to allocate balance of powers among the national and supranational orders. 67 In the judicial context, pre-emption is an emerging principle in EU. 68 Under this principle, the entire space is 66 See e.g. Shaw (2003) , supra note 39, at 303. occupied by EU law within the territory of the Union's exclusive powers. 69 In areas of nonexclusive EU powers, the national governments are free to act to the extent that the space is not occupied by the Union.
It is thus a generally established notion that when EU law moves in and occupies certain space in a given policy arena, national governments to that extent accordingly lose powers to act. As long as Article 293 EC existed, it remained a source of potential conflict for the Union actions to occupy the filed imperative for approximation of national tax provisions that directly impact the functioning of the single market. This in turn would assign an unambiguous supremacy to EU (legislation) initiatives in this policy area.
The subsidiarity dimension
In legal terms, the repeal of the clause can be construed as having an expansionary effect on the constraint posed by subsidiarity notion. Maastricht revision, the concept of differentiation in secondary law did not exist in EU law.
As discussed in Section 3.2 (Maastricht phase), almost the entire amount of flexibility was meant for outsider legal tools; it did not encompass secondary legislation within EU framework at all. The subsidiarity calculus designed to determine the scope of insider (EU)
actions essentially extended to all Member States so as to quantify whether objectives of an action can (sufficiently) be achieved at national level or otherwise (can be better attained at EU level). to prevent double taxation in the jurisdiction. The vacuum, in essence, would now be filled by the EU or, for and on its behalf, by (a minimum of) nine Member States in the guise of 77 Tuytschaever, supra note 16, at 240. 78 The term used in ibid., at 241. 79 Khan Niazi and Krever, supra note 9, at 460 referring to changing understanding of subsidiarity in the context of financial crisis in Europe and its possible response in European sub-systems. 80 The parlance 'principle of absentia' in its specific connotations is not being cited from the existing literature, and is being used here subjectively in the given EU constitutional context. This notion used in its given framework broadly enfolds a legal principle that may infuse utilitarian or operational activism into one set of legal provisions or enhance their applicative scope -without amending it -by virtue of repeal (or absentia) of another set of provisions in the same law.
enhanced cooperation clause to adopt supranational legislation. Overall, this could now -in the post-repeal period -be fairly construed as having an expansionary effect on the subsidiarity application to a Union action in a policy area based otherwise on implied powers.
Changing paradigms: constitutionalization of law and neofunctional politics
The demise of Article 293 EC also corresponds to the paradigmatic theories of recent times that unfold the legal and political processes of European transformation. In conceiving the constitutional construct and supranational governance, at least two leading concepts have gained currency since the 1990s and indeed revitalized literature that offers explanatory frameworks of European legal and political integration. One is the legal dimension that offers influential discourse on transformation of the governing treaties into an autonomous legal order. 81 The second is a political model that provides empirical evidence on how transnational actors and EU organs can play a role in shaping supranational politics alongside and beyond intergovernmental politics. 82 A common thread running along both these legal and political conceptions has grown more evident in the last couple of decades. 83 The legal-political concurrence is rooted in particular in (a) the profound impacts of ECJ rulings that shaped a constitution using international treaty law as a precursor and (b) activities at level of European
Commission that transformed an international organization into a federal-like structure. 
The sub-textual growth of legal basis
One might concede that a puzzle in relation to direct taxes and the repealed provision, one aspect yet seems to remain unresolved. Unlike income taxation, hardly any policy area of inter se cooperation exists that went missing from EU law unless its corresponding legal basis is refined or a more concrete legal basis is inserted. On the contrary however, as pointed out Strong insights with respect to this puzzle can a be had, again, in none other than the evolutionary construct of EU competences 86 -the way various legal bases for an array of policy areas were designed in the EU law over time. To cite but one pre-eminent instance is that of a catch-all general legal basis of the founding period, Article 100 EEC, meant for approximation of national laws incidental to the common market. This enabling clause also required stringent adherence to the unanimous consensus to legislate. Gradually, the functional capacity of this legal basis could not carry along the unfolding imperatives of the market agenda, and split into two legal bases during the first major treaty revision (SEA), that is, 100 EEC (now Art. 115 TFEU) and newly inserted 100a EEC (now Art. 114 TFEU). The new legal basis, also general in character, embedded wider potential for EU-level actions to cover almost all policy areas (except fiscal matters) due to its flexible design and majoritarian voting system. At the same time, powers also expanded to encompass certain specified policy areas. 87 In due course, a number of specialized legal bases for several policy areas also emerged. 88 One can posit that several legal bases (in theory) gradually bud off from the womb of once a single general enabling clause in accordance with the functional imperatives of the single market at different points in time.
The crux of the matter is that a general competence clause in theory can perform all the functions to an extent. Yet new specialized legal bases on the legal evolutionary path become inevitable and emerge in the EU system. This implies that with the expansion of transnational activity over time, the legal strength of the general enabling clause also accordingly changes below the static legal text. The market demand accrues underneath the general legal basis.
Hypothetically, when the force in the undergrowth of the general legal basis reaches a certain 86 On crucial relations between legal evolution and EU powers, Khan Niazi and Krever (supra note 9, at 457), for example, observe that 'The only way perhaps to make sense of the legislative regimes of the EU law is in the light of evolutionary developments of power equilibrium.'
87 See e.g. additions to the EU law under the SEA, supra note 54.
88 See e.g. European Commission, supra note 54 on new EU powers added under the Maastricht revision; and EU powers so forth added under subsequent revisions.
threshold, it cannot sustain carrying along the accumulated legal force for a given policy area and a new, relatively specialized, legal basis hatches from its womb.
In this framework, the sub-textual competence vested in the catch-all legal basis (Art. 115 TFEU) is not static. Rather, it varies at different points in time and thus grows along the temporal continuum depending upon the phase of the single market. The submerged powers for hazy or unspoken policy areas gradually emerge (in neofunctional terms, spillover). One must concede that several other factors might bolster (e.g. supranational actors) or constrain (e.g. national sovereignty concerns) these processes. Yet the neofunctional drive acts as a locomotive and leads the process of competence creation in European structure. 89 To this end, the enhanced scope or sub-textual growth of EU-level powers vested in Article 115 TFEU to integrate parts of the national tax policies incidental to single market is also unavoidable. non-EU environment, does nothing but only bolsters the neofunctional dynamics seeking enhanced room for EU-level actions in taxation.
Conclusion
The study explored the rationale and repercussions of the repeal of Article 293 TEC, in particular, its second paragraph, the sole explicit reference to income taxation in the EU constitution on elimination of double taxation through public international law tools. To understand the underlying legal consequences of the competence allocation in taxation between EU and Member States, the study built on a legal evolutionary model.
The investigation adopted a bigger picture approach taking into account developments taking place over time in European constitutional construct at the interface of EU and international law with Article 293 TEC being a tool of the latter. For this purpose, the study took an excursion into various constitutional clauses that remained part of the EU legal system at different points in time to promote cooperation between the Member States in several difficult policy areas under the auspices of public international law. The excursion into legal evolutionary discourse developed an explanatory framework which provides three take away messages that are equally applicable to the demise of the clause in question.
First, in areas where harmonization of national systems remained hard to achieve under the constitutional charter in the (growing) common market, international legal regime often served as the first port of call. It gradually (and often inevitably) paves the way towards 'Europeanization' in the given policy domains. Second, when international tools cultivate a degree of harmony in the national systems, constitutional spillover to bring European rule of law becomes attainable in these areas of high politics. That is, either new legal bases are added to EU constitution or the existing legal bases become more explicit for taking legislative actions under the European framework. This in turn renders the earlier constitutional clauses on inter se cooperation in given policy domain redundant. Third, depending upon the change in phase of integration in the European single market, the relationship between EU and international law is ever-evolving. The more the European constitution relies on international law regime in a given policy area, the less the EU order is autonomous in that particular field, and vice a versa. Thus, cleansing the European constitution of clauses (alien bodies) on inter se cooperation in given policy domains generally underpins the fact that the EU law has become mature and seeking autonomy from international legal order in those particular areas. This also applies to the flexibility regime existing in EU law to adopt differentiated legislation in sub-systems, that is, the procedure to adopt legislation applicable to a specified group of Member States. The same explanatory framework is also extendable to the causal logic behind the demise of Article 293 TEC.
Repeal of a tiny clause, widely debated in scholarship on EU income taxation, is thus not an isolated event but rather part of a bigger process in the evolution of the European legal system at the cross-roads of two legal regimes. 
